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FOREWORD
HRST: Preliminary Strategic Assessment
This document represents the final report for the Transportation System Analysis (TSA) - HRST
Strategic Assessment (NAS8-39209). This effort is an add-on task to the basic TSA contract. The
period of performance for the HRST Task was 30 Nov 1995 through 14 May 1996.
The opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the
Lockheed Martin Corporation position. The HRST analysis recognizes that NASA/MSFC has
already selected high payoff ASTP technologies. With these technology selections having
significant industry input, we believe the NASA/MSFC ASTP approaches are the appropriate
choices. We envision that the HRST program will take selected ASTP technologies (for ETO
only) to the next development level, e.g., a system prototype similar to the X-33 for the Reusable
Launch Vehicle (RLV) program. Following the NASA prototype risk reduction phase, the
technology becomes available to the commercial arena for further development. Consequently, the
authors decided that rather than focus on technology development assessment and roadmapping,
that they would focus this effort on trying to better understand the HRST strategic implications to
NASA and the Nation. This includes market enablement and capture. The Huntsville Office of
Lockheed Martin Astronautics views the HRST program as an overlay to existing and on-going
new space transportation programs.
HRST Lead Analyst
in
1.0 INTRODUCTION
The objective of this study is to provide a top level assessment of the proposed Highly Reusable
Space Transportation (HRST) system initiative. The concept assessment issues examined include
performance analysis of Earth-to-Orbit (ETO) operation and associated basing concepts. Our focus
is on the financial attractiveness of the HRST system initiative as an overlay to ongoing initiatives.
An HRST system initial operating capability is no later than 2015. Finally, the results of our
HRST system market capture study are presented, with conclusions regarding the potential
direction and viability of current HRST system concepts and approaches.
Our topic is future ETO activity, and we begin by analyzing markets through 2020. Concentrating
on Low Earth Orbit (LEO) activity, we look at payload classes between 20 and 40 Klbm, plus
payloads of less that 1 Klbm. Topics addressed are core markets, programmatics, and
competitiveness against conventional expendable launch vehicle (ELV) and planned reusable
launch vehicle (RLV) services.
Our HRST system assessment study groundrules include:
• An HRST system time window focus for a 2015 IOC --- a 2030 IOC is not addressed
• X-33/RLV/EELV/ASTP funded beyond 2000
• The HRST system primary goal is dramatic ETO price reduction
• The HRST system focuses on reusability
• Leading HRST system technology candidates contained in Advanced Space Transportation
Program (ASTP) include:
Rocket-Based Combined Cycle (RBCC)
- MagLifter
Low cost upper stages
• The primary HRST system markets: Payloads from 20 to 40 Klbm, and <1 Klbm (LEO
equivalent)
The HRST program will likely require <$5B to IOC. This assumes that a Highly Reusable Launch
Vehicle (HRLV) development (prototype plus EMD phase) can be fielded for substantially less
than the RLV ($6B-$9B). Thus, a US Government (USG) and industry partnership (including
initial flight guarantees) is very likely. Our study assumes that NASA will have the primary USG
role in the HRST system. Specifically, NASA will provide primary funding up to at least the
commercialization phase (e.g. through ASTP prototyping).
Several assumptions were made about the future global launch environment. First, ongoing
USAF and NASA development programs are expected to remain in place into the next century.
Should the maturity of these launch systems confh'm expectations in operational cost, many new
access-to-space markets could be exploited that were previously impossible to pursue. Concepts
include the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) system (to support USAF missions out
through 2010), the X-33/RLV system (which has a 2004 IOC), plus potential launch systems
evolving from X-34 development and the ASTP. Modernization of the commercial ELV system
community is also assumed to continue. This would result in cost-effective competition for any
reusable system at least through 2010. This ELV competition will come from both domestic and
foreign systems. These activities underscore the concern that a new launch system would enter an
ETO market environment already saturated by developing or on-line launch systems, and
remaining saturated well into the next century. These current launch systems can be expected to
have priority over any new start, both in investment dollars and likely in initial market share.
Certainly not all of these initiatives will prove successful. However, it is likely that one or more
will, and thus play an important role in evolving or revolutionizing space access. Part of the
outcome hinges upon payload developments. Key here will be the degree to which spacecraft
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(S/C) developmentandrecurringcostsaresystematicallyreducedin all markets. Similarly, the
adventof paradigm-breakingmarketssuchasTeledesicis alsocritical. In short, the interplayof
advancesinETOandS/Csystemswill determinethefuturebrightnessof thespacearena.
As a generalprinciple, we areconvincedthat a reusable(fully or partially) ETO transportation
system is the way of the future. We see limited gains in ELV, especially in the 20 to 40 Klbm LEO
market. Our own experience in this market technology tells us that reusability is clearly the
appropriate approach. Furthermore, we define the HRST program as one embodiment of ASTP
technology into government/commercially development ETO systems. Indeed, one could say that
the HRST program is the commercially viable aspect of ASTP. The selected ASTP technologies
being pursued by NASA, whether RBCC or MagLifter, hybrid motors or other booster motors,
will drive the resulting cost of the HRST system and determine its commercial future and form. In
this report we will refer to the HRST program as an overarching program incorporating ASTP
technology. The actual vehicle(s) that might result from the HRST initiative we will define as
HRLV (Highly Reusable Launch Vehicle).
The first step in the process is to forecast the access to space market place.
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2.0 TRAFFIC MODEL FORECASTS
The strength of any reusable space transportation system concept stems from the belief that it will
require dramatically lower operating costs (compared to today's launch fleet) and is capable of
rapid turn around. Thus, a very cost-effective, high flight rate potential exists, expected over time
to open new space access markets. The domestic expendable launch vehicle (ELV) market today
(both government and commercial) is expensive, but highly price-competitive and generally
reliable. The substantial capture of this ELV market that is a critical first step toward making any
HRST system program successful. An HRLV system can only enable new markets after
establishing its credentials in existing markets. For a multi-billion dollar HRLV development, this
likely requires some form of launch guarantees to gain investor support (RLV is an analog).
2.1 Core Markets/Forecast (beyond 2000)
2.1.1 Methodology
Our approach to HRLV/RLV market capture is incremental in nature. We first establish a "core"
market base (see Figure 2-1). This core represents a conservative estimate of the known market.
It consists of US Government (NASA plus DoD) and worldwide commercial payloads. The
HRLV/RLV system must initially capture major segments of this market, from today's
incumbents, in order to rationalize the vehicle investment payback. We will discuss this core
market in Section 2.1.2
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Figure 2-1: Core Market plus Growth Market Capture
We see the new, growth markets as a series of overlays to the core. These markets include widely
disparate missions, from Teledesic to space tourism. Both US Govemment (USG) and
commercial payloads are addressed. The ability to enable these markets is dependent upon the
HRLV/RLV pricing structure (see Section 2.3).
2.1.2 Core Market Assessment
The forecasted core domestic space launch market can be partitioned into several components based
upon payload category/user:
• US Government (USG)
- DoD (USAF/USN primarily)
- Intelligence
- Civil (e.g. NASA)
• GTO Commercial (primary communications/broadcast)
- US Satellites
- International/Foreign Satellites
• LEO Commercial (communications/remote sensing)
- US and Foreign new markets
- Constellations communication consists primarily of large LEO (polar)
- Remote sensing satellite are single, LEO (polar)
To service these markets today, the US relies on its fleet of ELVs plus the STS. In aggregate, the
US will launch approximately 30 flights per year in the medium, intermediate, and heavy launch
vehicle classes (including STS) during the mid-1990s. Typical annual flight rates are broken out
as follows:
• STS = 7
• Titan IV =3-5
• Atlas =8-10
• Delta =8-16
- HLV (Heavy Launch Vehicle)
- ILV (Intermediate Launch Vehicle)
- MLV (Medium Launch Vehicle)
Smaller ELVs (e.g. SLV) would add to this list, including such vehicles as LMLV, Taurus,
Conestoga, and Pegasus.
In our support of the current X-33/Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV) program, an investigation was
conducted to determine the credibility of an RLV take-over of the US market from the above
incumbents. We elected to exclude SLVs from our RLV capture analysis due to the much smaller
delivery capacity of SLVs, and because the RLV is not expected to be price competitive against
SLVs. Thinking more globally begs the question whether an RLV system can successfully
compete with the world's ELV fleets, illustrated in Figure 2-2. Note that the ELV payloads span a
huge range, from 7 to 48 Klbm to LEO. It will be challenging for any reusable launch system to
successfully compete across such a wide payload range.
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• Performance based on launch from current launch sites.
Figure 2-2: The World's ELV Fleets
Figure 2-3 highlights our estimate of the global core market beyond 2C00. This is the core market
that the HRLV system must initially dominate before it can enable new _owth markets. As noted,
only MLV, ILV, and HLV (including STS equivalent) payload classes are included. Furthermore,
all forei=ma government pre-assigned missions have been eliminated. Primary source data comes
from COMSTAC (May 1995), an assessment of ISS support requirements, and the Early
Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) RFP (May 1995). The cyclic variations reflect periodic
replenishments of different satellite constellations (GPS, Big LEO, etc.).
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Figure 2-3: Global Market Forecast
2009 2010
A steady state demand of -50 missions per year is forecasted by 2010. Some of the commercial
missions (e.g. GTO) could be dual manifested, thus reducing the number of flights plotted. The
increase in NASA missions is attributable to STS-to-RLV phasing. The seven STS flights per year
(five for ISS support) are transitioned to 15 RLV flights (all for ISS support). NASA and DoD
payloads are obviously committed to US carriers.
The GTO and Big LEO classes (e.g. Iridium, Globalstar, etc.) were included in the commercial
market segment. For our core market analysis, the Mega LEO class (e.g. Teledesic) was excluded.
As a market segment, the commercial market offers the greatest (i.e. largest number of missions)
long-term growth for a reusable launch system. Today, this market segment consists primarily of
GTO communications and direct TV broadcast satellites.
Figure 2-4 (commercial, worldwide GTO market) shows that over the time window of 2001 to
2009, the Modest Growth Model averages 19.3 flights per year, while the High Growth Model
averages 32.8 flights per year. Over 85% of both models are populated with satellites in the 4 to
10 Klbm classes. Note the cyclic nature of the GTO trend. Following a broad peak in the mid-late
1990's, we see a valley in the trend (2001 to 2003) followed later by another broad peak. The
period is from 8 to 10 years. Interestingly, the 1995 COMSTAC shows an increase of
approximately 20% in flight rate over their 1994 report. Before selecting the COMSTAC model,
other commercial ELV forecasts were reviewed including Arianespace and CSP Associates. Our
core market adopts a forecast intermediate between Modest Growth and High Growth, based upon
discussions with our International Launch Services group.
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Figure 2-4: COMSTAC Commercial GTO Forecast
The total commercial market forecast consists of the GTO market plus two other emerging new
markets, Big LEO and remote sensing. Extrapolating the COMSTAC model beyond 2005, five
MLV class flights per year were added (2002 - 2005 and 2008 - 2011) to account for deploying
new blocks of Big LEO payloads (specifically Iridium and Globalstar). At least one market
forecast (Teal Group) predicts that Big LEO (and Mega LEO) will cause some erosion the GTO
6
market. For thepurposesof establishinga baselinecoretraffic modelfor the RLV program,we
assumedno commercialremotesensingsatellitedeploymentsin theMLV or greaterclasses.We
believetheselaunchesareprimarily aimedattheSLV class.
A listingof theprincipalbaseline(coremarket)payloadsis shownin Figure 2-5. It displays-45
flights/year. Thesourcefor mostof this datais theEELV RFP. This figure providesimportant
informationoneachof thepayloads.
Throw Wt
Category Payload Coast Orbit
•SBIR GEO
DSCS
GPS IIF
__ • Discovery
__ EOS PM
EOSCHEM
MLV-N
_-_ , ,_i_
DMSP 5DIll
_;ul/'lerL;OU ADV MILSATCOM
Commerical
ISS
ISpace Station)
MISSION A
MISSION B
• COMLSAT A
• COMLSAT B
• BIG LEO
• MEGA LEO
mPLM
CM (Crew Module)
ULC
East
East
East
East
West
West
West
West
West
East
West
East
East/West
East
East
West
West
East
East
East
GTO
GTO
GPS
Planetary
Sun-Synch
Sun-Synch
Sun-Synch
Polar
Sun-Synch
GTO
Sun-Synch
GTO
LEO
GTO
GTO
Polar
Polar
LEO
LEO
LEO
I
Apogee Perigee
(Ibs.) (NM) (NM)
7450 19324 90
6125 22640 3568
4250 10998 100
2000 N/A N/A
11220 380 380
7000-8000 380 380
7900 380 380
6000 500 500
4100 450 450
7900 19324 90
4000-5000 450 450
8500 19324 90
17000 100 100
4060 19323 100
6-12000 19324 90
11000 420 420
11000 420 420
25OOO
25000
18000
244 244
• FINAL ORBIT--
Inclination U.S.
(Degrees) Flts/Yr
GTO 0.8
GTO 0.2
55 3.0
GTO O.3
98.2 0,2
98.2 0.1
98.2 0.2
90 0.4
98.2 0.5
GTO 0.5
98.2 0.4
GTO 0.9
63.4 0.3
GTO 2.5
GTO 6-18
86.4 2.5
82.0 TBD
51.6 9.0 \
4.0 RLV
2.0 /
Note 1: RLV delivers payloads to 100 X 100 nm at indicated inclination; upper stage/apogee kick motor makes final
orbital insertion. Except: ISS for which RLV delivers payloads to ISS
Note 2: For GTO/GPS missions RLV delivers a mass of - 4.4 X throw wt to lOOX 100 nm
Note 3: For polar missions RLV delivers a mass of ~ 1.5 X throw wt to 100 X leO nm
Shaded Mlssio_: EELV captures these classes prior to and including the year 2011 (assumption)
Figure 2-5: RLV "Most Likely" Traffic Model (>2010): Core Market
?
2.2 PayloadDriversSizeHRLV/RLV
To captureall of the coremissionsspecifiedin Figure 2-5, we simply went down that list to
determinewhich payloadsactuallydrive RLV performance(massdelivery) and configuration
(payloadsize). Thenominalpayloaddriversareshownin Figure2-6.
RecallthattheNASA RLV CAN stipulated-25 Klbm delivery to ISS (i=51.6 °, h<244 nm). We
sized our RLV to meet this requirement. Notice that three drivers (one for ISS, GTO, and
POLAR) are displayed. Each payload, in its own way, is a "driving" mission for RLV.
The mPLM (mini Pressurized Logistics Module) with support ASE (including docking
mechanism) requires 24 Klbm delivery to ISS. The polar mission driver is shown to be the EOS-
AM (11 Klbm). Although this particular payload is scheduled for 1998, we believe it is
representative of >2004 USG polar payloads (NASA, USAF, and Intelligence). Fully outfitted in
the payload bay, it should weigh -18 Klbs. This is very close to the maximum delivery capability
of the RLV to this inclination. Notice too, that a small U/S (upper stage) is required to transfer the
payload from the 100 x 100 nm RLV orbit to the final EOS-AM destination (350 X 350 nm). Not
shown, multi-manifested Teledesic (Mega LEO) could also drive this mission (both mass and
volume).
ISS GTO Polar
220 x 220 @ 51.6" 90 x 19,330 O 26.5* 350 x 350 @ 98.3"
15 ft Diameter
Payload Bay
I
45 ft F tyload
Bay L _ngth
Serv,,ce Module,
Modred mPLM _
v,_ Body:_
Adaplor
I2.5 ft. 10.4 ft
Mass to Orbit (klbs) 24
Packaged Length (1t) < 25
Packaged Diameter (ft) 15
" All Payloads Assume 2 ft. Clearance on Either End
Figure 2-6:
fro#, EELV
35
39
15
RL V Payload Drivers
18
32
13
The GTO mission (represented by Intelsat VI) provides the payload bay length driver (>30 ft). All
GTO missions will require a storable U/S (see Figure 2-6). Thus, a 9 Klbm GTO satellite requires
an RLV capability of over 35 Klbm to LEO. Based on mass, the RLV should be able to deliver
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mostforeseeablecommercialsatellites_11 Klbm). However,payloadbay lengthcouldbecome
anissue.We haverecentlybecomeawareof anemergingcommercialGTO trendto split theILV
market:
• ILV:
• ILV+ (orHLV):
6.0-8.4Klbm GTO
9.0-11.0+Klbm GTO
Exactlyhow thesetwo marketswill bepopulated>_2004is unknown,but we believeour larger
payloadbay servesus well should this trend occur. Similarly, if Titan IV payloadsare
downscaled,a largepayloadbayis verybeneficial. We havebaselineda new storableU/S which
wearecurrentlyproposingin ourEELV contractwith theUSAF. As indicatedin Figure2-6, we
havebaselinedapayloadbaywhichis 15ft (diameter)X 45 ft (length).We believethis is prudent
in light of: futurepayloadlengthuncertainty,U/Sconfiguration,andpotentialmulti-manifestingof
payloads.
2.3 Vision2020: PotentialHRLV/RLV GrowthMarkets
Our Vision 2020modelprovidesanoptimisticpredictionof domesticand foreign launchtraffic
from 2004(predictedyearfor RLV introduction)to 2020, in orderto discoverfuturistic reusable
spacetransportationsystemmarkets. This market includesboth the core market previously
addressed,plusnewgrowthmarketsfor theHRLV/RLV system. The Vision2020 modelshould
becontrastedwithour "core" (conservative,"mustwin") marketdiscussionin Section2.1
This futuristictraffic modelwasderivedfrom severalsources,includingCSTS(CommercialSpace
TransportationStudy), and our ongoing X-33 PhaseI analysis. Potentialmarketsfor the
HRLV/RLV systemwould include:
plus,
CoreMarkets:
- ISS
- NASA/other(Delta)
- DoD/GTO(AtlasandTitanIV)
- DoD/Polar(Delta)
- Commercial/GTO
- Big LEO (Commercial,Polar)
GrowthMarkets:
- LMI (LunarMarsInitiative)LEO
- DoD/TAV
- MegaLEO (Commercial,Polar)
- Free-Flyers(Commercial)
- Tourism(Commercial,Manned)
- BusinessPark(Commercial,Manned)
- NuclearWasteDisposal(Commercial)
Mostareself-explanatory,butafew commentsarein order. First LMI LEO is therevisitationof
theLunar/MarsInitiative. For our studywe assumedthattheISS would eventuallybeconverted
intoaLEO spacenodefor flightsto themoon/planets.Our traffic modelthenattemptsto estimate
thetraffic upto thisLEO nodeto supportthesemissions.
Next,althoughwelist HRLV/RLV for DoD applications(e.g. TAV), we will excludeit from our
trafficmodelcapturebecauseit is likely to beoperatedindependentlyof all othersshown. Exactly
how manymissionsof eachcategoryHRLV/RLV cancaptureremainsto beseen. Marketprice
and vehicleavailability/costwill largelydictatemissioncapture. Our preliminaryconservative
analysissuggeststhatthe last four categories(Free-Flyers,Tourism, BusinessPark, andNuclear
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WasteDisposal)arenot likely to occurin thetime framefor RLV becauseof marketprice/cost
considerations(seeSection3.1.2). Free-Flyerswill probablybemanifestedasa secondpayload
andthereforewill not bedisplayedasseparatemissions, due againto price/costconsiderations.
Severalof these four excludedmissionscould conceivablybe capturedby HRLV, if the
pricing/costwereappropriatelylow (Section5.2).
Thepotentialtotalgloballaunchvehicletraffic from 2004to 2020is shownin Figure2-7. In this
figure,theglobaltraffic ispartitionedinto variousmissioncategories(e.g. ISS, commercialGTO,
Big LEO, etc.). It addressesmarketswhich are expectedto be of potentialgovernmentand
commercialinterest,especiallyif amatureRLV systemexists. Thepredictedannuallaunchrates
for eachmissioncategoryis provided.Launchvehiclesystemsincludedin themodelarethe STS
andELVs of MLV, ILV or HLV class. Also includedareHRLV/RLV systems(both domestic
and foreign) that axeassumed under development and competing with the ELV classes for
predicted markets. ELVs of the SLV class (vehicles with <2000 Ibm payload capacity) are not
addressed. We will address this class separately (see Section 6.0). Figure 2-7 assumes a general
and gradual increase in launch vehicle traffic over the first 10 years of the model, with a significant
increase in launch activity after 2015.
Missions
(Total Global Traffic)
• ISS
* LMI LEO
• NASA/other
• DoD/GTO
• DoD/Polar
• Foreign Government
• Commerclal/fd'l'O
• Big LEO (Commercial. Polar)
• Mega LEO (Commercial. Polar)
Annual Foreign Totals
Annual US Totals
2004 2005 2.006 2007 2008 2009 2010 :_011 2012 2013 2014 ZOI5 2016 2017 2018 2019 ?,020
15 16 21 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 21 12 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 4 4 4 4 0 0 0 0 4 8 30 35 35 35 35
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ! 1 1 1 1 I
5 3 5 5 6 4 4 4 3 3 4 2 2 2 3 2 1
4 3 3 4 5 3 5 6 3 5 5 3 5 4 5 4 3
18 11 15 12 16 10 12 9 10 10 9 9 11 9 9 I0 !0
21 19 24 22 30 18 18 20 23 29 31 32 34 32 31 26 27
7 4 0 0 7 7 7 2 0 0 5 5 5 0 0 0 0
56 I 6 6 59 58 16 16 61 61 21 21 63 66 21 21 55
81 29 36 28 57 48 26 27 51 59 42 40 72 72 45 42 76
44 29 43 4_ 94 88 60 54 73 73 59 53 79 77 60 57 61
Figure 2-7: Total Potential Global Traffic: 2004 to 2020
As RLV system technolo_ and operation matures, both domestically and abroad, ELV systems
globally can be expected to be gradually replaced. An approximate seven year global transition
period can be expected, beginning around the 2008 time frame, and progressing through 2015.
During this time, RLV systems will experience increased operability and decreasing costs,
encroaching on traditional ELV markets. With some possible exceptions, markets requiring ELV
services will be minimized over time, subsequently reducing ELV activity to an insignificant
segment of the launch traffic after 2016. With the lower cost RLV systems finally dominating the
global launch market, a significant increase in overall launch activity is predicted after 2015.
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Figure 2-8: Predicted ELV and RLV Global Traffic: 2004 to 2020
The Vision 2020 model identifies future market interests and activity levels of our international
launch system competitors. Figure 2-9 identifies various markets, the amount of mission activity
associated with those markets, and the source of that activity from 2004 to 2020. Potential leading
competitors include:
• European Community, with Arianespace ELVs and future ESA LV development
including a European RLV (or potentially HRLV)
• Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), with Proton, Zenit, Soyuz and a potential
RLV development
• Japan, with the H-2 ELV, H-2 upgrades or RLV system
• Peoples Republic of China (PRC), with the Long March ELV series (RLV capability before
2020 doubtful unless purchased)
As in other figures, domestic RLV systems eventually dominate all access-to-space markets
identified. The European Community is seen as our nearest competitor in the long term, and most
active in the Commercial and Mega LEO markets.
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Figure 2-9: Worm Market Distribution: 2004 to 2020
Many of the futuristic model markets can only be enabled if ETO prices are slashed far below (> 10
times) today's prices. In fact, it is unclear at this point whether our price projections for our RLV
concept are sufficiently low. We have adopted much of the CSTS (1993-94) market enablement
projections to establish our thresholds.
More importantly, our recent RLV work and ongoing Atlas HAP, development tells us that it is not
simply a matter of developing a new launch vehicle and the market beating your door down. As
with any major new development, it is cash flow and financial exposure that ultimately energizes
(or not) the program. And in the case of a multi-billion dollar program, it is unlikely that the
commercial sector (industry plus investors) will go it alone, especially if the risk is perceived high.
Thus, the USG must be a willing partner, at least up to the point where risk is sufficiently retired
so that the commercial sector can assume the primary development responsibility. Even then the
USG must sometimes guarantee some level of launch commitment to make the market risk
acceptable. The current RLV program analog appears as a credible model for this purpose
(HRST). Note that Atlas IIAR/Delta l]]/SeaLaunch initiatives are inappropriate models because of
smaller investments, lower technical risks, and lower market risks.
The potential HRLV market capture would notionally begin with RLV market capture, and
incrementally expand on it to the degree that its pricing structure and flight dependability
warranted. Thus, it should at least capture the RLV totals shown in Figure 2-8, ultimately
expanding the market share. Additionally, several of the growth missions excluded in the RLV
market assessment (e.g., Tourism, etc.) may materialize. The next section attempts to correlate
pricing thresholds with market segment enablement. Examples from today's core markets to
growth markets are addressed.
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3.0 CAPTURING THE MARKET: HRLV/RLV PRICING
Capturing large portions of current markets for transportation to and from space, while at the same
time opening space to new markets, is a critical link in the integrated strategy for making
HRLV/RLV a viable business. A primary strength of the HRLV/RLV concept stems from the fact
that it will offer dramatically lower operating costs when compared to today's launch fleet. As a
fully reusable system, operating costs are almost entirely fixed, so that the marginal cost to fly each
additional flight is small when compared to expendable systems. Additionally, the high degree of
operability inherent in the reusable design allows rapid flight-to-flight turnaround, resulting in a
capability to sustain significantly higher flight rates relative to current systems. As shown in
Figure 3-1, these system attributes have a significant impact on cost per flight, and, therefore,
potential profitability.
Total System Cost
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Figure 3-h Launch System Cost Sensitivity to Flight Rate
As illustrated, the HRLV/RLV must fly often to significantly reduce recurring costs. Designing the
system to sustain high flight rates is important. However, if the demand for transportation does
not support high flight rates, the under-utilized system will quickly become extremely costly and
potentially not sustainable in a commercially competitive environment. Accordingly, our market
capture strategy is key to the successful development and implementation of any HRLV/RLV
business plan. Our market capture strategy can be summarized as a three step approach:
1. Define core markets: Characterize the core markets for space transportation. Identify who the
customers are, what requirements they maintain in terms of payload characteristics, number of
payloads, destinations (e.g., altitude and inclination), retum payloads, inclusion of manned
capabilities, and other relevant requirements. Core markets are considered existing segments and
forecasted continuation and expansion of those segments, such as NASA - International Space
Station (ISS) and science missions, DoD - communication and intelligence missions, and
Commercial - geosynchronous communication missions, and near term, large-scale, polar-orbiting
communication systems.
2. Provide a responsive product: Design and build an HRLV/RLV system which is responsive to
customer needs. The system must provide a competitive launch service which meets a wide range
of customers with many disparate needs. This element of the strategy must consider all elements
of the HRLV/RLV system, including the vehicle, basing, and operations concepts.
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3. Develop a viable pricing structure: Develop a pricing structure which balances the need for low
prices to compete in current markets and open important new markets, with the need to generate
revenues sufficient to ensure recovery of the high initial investment. Recognize and exploit the
sensitivities, or "elasticity", within the various market segments.
The market capture strategy must provide a credible, robust story persuasive to all stakeholders,
underpinning each facet of the proposed markets, and including solid rationale addressing the key
issues associated with each market segment.
3.1 Enabling Future Markets: Entry Price Thresholds
In assessing the HRLV/RLV system potential to capture future markets, we cursorily investigated
what we call: "Entry Price Barriers" and how well our RLV concept measured against these
barriers. We examined several of the "Second Wave" and 'q'hird Wave" markets (longer term,
higher risk).
First, how well does our baseline RLV concept meet the core market entry price barriers? To recap
briefly:
• ELV GTO (ILV) Market (circa 2004): $7500/1bm (today -$11000/Ibm)
• RLV GTO (ILV) Market: $4500 - $5600/lbm
Corresponding recurring costs for this GTO class: ELV ($6600/lbm) and RLV (-$1000/lbm).
Thus, we feel comfortable that our RLV concept is fairly robust in the core markets. Next, we
examined Teledesic and Space Business Park/Tourism as examples of Second and Third Wave
growth markets, respectively. We will also assess the HRLV system potential in all three markets.
3.1.1 Teledesic: SecondWave
An overview of the RLV - Teledesic manifest is shown in Figure 3-2. As illustrated, we can co-
manifest up to six individual S/C.
Cargo Bay:. 15 ft. diameter x 46 ft. long
6 Teledesic (packaged)
6 Teledesic Spacecraft 12,000
Transfer Stage (modified OAM)
Dry Weight 1,430
Propellant 1,116
Airt:orne Support Equipment
12,000
2,546
3T000
17,546
View A-A
Figure 3-2: RL V Co-Manifesting of Teledesic
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For Teledesic, we propose a customer price initially of $30M/flight. This equates to $2500/lbm to
polar orbit or alternately $5M/satellite. Teledesic has stated a goal of $3.3M/satellite. Best
estimates are that ELV delivery would cost Teledesic between $8 - $15M/satellite. Thus, we
believe that RLV not only is super price competitive (versus ELV), but comes close to meeting the
Teledesic's very optimistic goals. Analysis of revenues suggest that during deployment years,
RLV could generate over $900M/year from Teledesic alone (30 flights/year). Gross profits
derived from Teledesic (Revenue - Costs) could reach $600/year. This level of RLV support for
Teledesic assumes that RLV would capture 40% of the 840 baseline deployment. If Teledesic
offered a greater deployment share (~60%), we could drop prices to say $25M/flight
($4.2M/satellite) and generate revenues of $1050M/year (gross profits = $630M/year). Later (in
Section 5.5), we will use this RLV price and associated capture in our contrast of RLV-vs-HRLV.
The bottomline is that RLV appears to easily pass the entry price barriers -- certainly when
compared to ELV.
3.1.2 'q'hird Wave" Market Example
An example of a future market is space business park/tourism. For this RLV application, we first
reviewed the CSTS (Commercial Space Transportation Study) final report. Specifically, we used
the study's prediction of cost per passenger as input to our analysis. If we establish a per
passenger price of $0.2M, we can then develop a possible business (hotel) park/tourism scenario
(see Figure 3-3).
ROI Calculation
(Simplified)
Business Investment
(In Addition to RLV
Development)
Required IFlight Rate
II
Weekend in LEO I
Hotel + RLV Investment II$400M - Twin Modules (20 Passengers + 10 Crew)$2000M - LEO Modules (20)$600M - Delivery/Assembly (30 Fits.)
I
10 Year ROI
I
I $3000M = 10(Pass) (PPP) (Fit. Rate)
I L_ $0.2 M each2 /Fit
Fit. Rate = 75 / year (1500 Passengers Annually)
$3,000M
LEO
Investment
$8oo
$6oo
$4oo
Enterprise
(per year)
RLV Costs
(per year)
(Space Hotel OPS
costs not included)
I Projected: RLV Operations Costs Too High to Accommodate LEO Hotel/Tourism I
Figure 3-3: Weekend in LEO (Hotel): RLV Unprofitabili_.
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The business park example we will consider is "A Weekend in LEO", in which 20 passengers (-10
couples) spend a weekend in LEO at a space hotel. The business investment to develop the
hotel/delivery infrastructure is shown in the upper portion of the figure -- about $3000M in total is
estimated. The RLV development cost is not even included, nor any investment amortization "tax"
(assumed a sunk cost). Hence, this is a very optimistic calculation. Next we calculated a
simplified ROI. Thus, we divide the investment ($3000M) by the yearly revenues and demand a
10 year pay back period. From this, we deduce that 75 flights/year (1500 passengers) are
required. When bench marked against CSTS, we observe that our requirement far exceeds their
nominal forecast of-750 passengers at $0.2M each. Only if the very optimistic CSTS forecast is
used, do we find a reasonable passenger/price correlation. Furthermore, using even $4M/flight for
RLV to support the mission (20 paying passengers at $0.2M each), we see that revenues fall short
of RLV operation costs. We used $10M/flight for recurring operations. Obviously, we need to
slash operating costs dramatically to ensure profitabilit),. To this end, we would propose that the
RLV program would carry $50 - $100M annually for lWI, specifically to reduce recurring operation
costs. Even so, we are doubtful that the currently envisioned RLV will be priced sufficiently low
enough to enable this market or several other futuristic markets (e.g. nuclear waste disposal, etc.)
Alternately, the introduction of a more advanced ETO system (e.g. HRLV) might have a better
probability of bringing down recurring costs. However, reducing recurring costs is important only
if it translates into lower customer prices. How well does the HRLV system capture the postulated
LEO Hotel market? Figure 3-4 illustrates the previous analysis shown in Figure 3-3, but with
HRLV substituted for RLV.
16
Business Investment
(In Addition to HRLV
Development)
ROI Calculation
(Simplified)
Required IFlight Rate
I Weekend in LEO I
Hotel + Deployment
• $400M - Twin Modules (20 Passengers + 10 Crew)
• $2000M - LEO Modules (20)
• $300M oDelivery/Assembly (30 Fits.)
I
10 Year ROI
I
I $2700M = 10(Pass) (PPP) (Fit. Rate)
I L_ $o.2 M each20/Fit
Fit. Rate = 67 / year (1340 Passengers Annually)
1
Single LEO Visit
Revenues
_M
ml
HRLV Ops
$2.25M
HRLV
Amortization
$0.7M
$2,700M
LEO
Investment
LEO Hotel
Ops
$0.3M
I !I
Recurring
Cost Total
$3.25M
Figure 3-4: Weekend in LEO (Hotel): HRLV Assessment
Because of the lower HRLV system prices, note that the enterprise investment is reduced by
$300M to $2700M. As a result, only 67 HRLV tourist flights/year are required. Revenues (per
visitation) remain at $4M/fli_t (-$268M/year). However, the HRLV recurring cost picture is
dramatically improved. As shown, about $3.25M/flight (visitation) is needed to operate the HRLV
plus LEO Hotel. We have included several recurring cost elements: HRLV ops (see Section 5.2),
HRLV amortization, and LEO Hotel ops ($20M/year).
Thus, enterprise revenues exceed outlays (ops costs) by $0.75M/flight, or $1.45M/flight if HRLV
amortization is dropped. However, the margin is very delicate. Recall that the CSTS nominal
forecast suggests only 38 flights/year, not 67 flights/year. Consequently, the revenue stream is
optimistic at best. It may be that $4M/flight is too high a price to charge for 20 passengers.
In the next section, we postulate how a joint USG/Commercial HRST enterprise might occur. The
central issue: what will NASA decide to do with future manned space transportation?
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4.0 MLV/ILV/HLV-CLASS HRST PROGRAM ASSESSMENT
By the end of the decade, the government must decide on a course of action for manned space
flight. Three basic options exist:
• Option 1: NASA and the STS contractor -- USA (United Space Alliance) will continue to
maintain the existing STS fleet or
• Option 2: NASA could initiate an STS modernization (NASA procurement) program and
thus, continue to rely on the STS, or
• Option 3: Commercial sector that is industry led, government sponsored could develop on
its own an RLV (for STS replacement) with a USG loan guarantee and equitable
price structure (with USG flight guarantees).
One of these basic options is likely to be selected by the USG before the end of the century.
Although it is obviously not possible to prejudge the outcome of this decision, it is possible to
critique each. For each of the 3 options, we will overlay a hypothetical HRST program, and
measure its budgetary implications for NASA. Only the HRST risk reduction costs (through
HRLV prototype) are added to the NASA budget line. For this NASA options analysis actual
commercialization is assumed "off budget" (e.g. a commercial development).
Option 1 is the easiest course, but is indecisive and shortsighted. It fails to prudently come to grips
with the aging STS issue in a timely manner. It assumes no orbiter losses, additions or
replacements. To continue to fly STS without providing for a modernization program is likely to
eventually lead to another Challenger catastrophe. In time, NASA would be forced to a new
launch vehicle development, or to add significant funding for STS modernization, probably as the
result of a national outcry against STS neglect. The financial commitment that NASA will be
required to make will surely exceed available funding, and likely drive any new start resembling an
HRST beyond its currently scheduled IOC. This is illustrated in Figure 4-1. The actual HRLV
"commercial" development (another $3-5B) is assumed "off budget" (NASA) and is not shown.
The HRLV IOC would occur in -2018-19. If manned space access continues to be central to
NASA's mission, then NASA must make a responsible, pro-active STS modernization decision.
The status quo option is not a proper course.
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Figure 4-1: Maintain Current STS with No Modernization (Option 1)
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Option2 representsa moremeaningfulresponseto STScontinuation,but alsohascriticalflaws.
Figure4-2 lays out a notionalNASA spacetransportationfunding requirementsprofile. This
profile illustratesthat a NASA fundedSTSmodemizationwould severelyoverrun the NASA
TransportationCeiling. Severalbudgetcomponentsareincluded: STSOperations(conductedby
the NASA STS contractorUSA (United Space Alliance), STS p3I, and a notional STS
modernizationinvestment(including a new orbiter). For this analysiswe assumethat USA
succeedsin reducingSTSannualoperationscoststo $2.5B/yearby 2000. Additionally, STSp3I
is estimatedto be -$0.3B/year,significantlybelow today's levels. Next we showhow a $3.0B
STSmodernizationmightoverlaythis base;anew orbiter (-$1.5B) comeson line in 2010. The
costbenefitsof themodernizationrevealthemselvesin aslightloweringof theSTSoperationscost
(2003).
Two problems stand out in Option 2. First, the NREC$ investment is probably too low.
Secondly, a new orbiter is likely underestimated. The bottom line is that even this optimistic
modernization program is going to far exceed NASA's transportation budget in the 2001-02 time
frame --just when the ISS is achieving Permanent Human Capability. And the same problem
facing HRLV in Option 1 still remains - that an overwhelming financial commitment is required by
NASA and the subsequent HRLV delayed IOC. Again, the actual HRLV commercial development
is off budget. NASA may slip HRLV IOC, given that it was already committed to an STS
modernization program. Perhaps an HRLV IOC of 2022 would be appropriate.
m HRST Risk Reduction Phase
HRST Operations
tm STS Product Improvements II
r'-I STS Operations ISTS Modernization
STS
Modernization
STS Modernization) STS Modernization
Decision Jeopardizes
HRST IOC of 2015
Yea r
Figure 4-2: STS Modernization Profile (Option 2)
Option 3 represents a commercially developed RLV alternative to STS modemization. Shown in
Figure 4-3 is the corresponding NASA funding profile to cover this program option. Note that we3
have provided budget lines for STS operation, a declining STS P I program, NASA ISS
infrastructure development, ISS mPLM and Crew Module development/production, and RLV
operations to support ISS servicing. Conspicuously absent is any NASA direct funding for RLV
development. It is assumed that Lockheed-Martin would commercially develop the RLV system
and facilities.
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TheISSinfrastructurefundingrepresentsNASA development/procurementof (1) RLV passenger
module($0.6B)plus(2) mPLM (discussedin Section4) andotherinfrastructureadditions($0.3B)
to accommodateRLV. Although the STS operationstransition to RLV from 2004-06, the
estimatedSTS operation costs do not decreasemarkedly until 2006. Two fundamental
observationsaboutthisNASA-industryoptioninclude:
• NASA spacetransportationceilingexceededonly veryslightly($300Min 2004)
comparedto STSmodernization,and
• NASA realizessignificantsavingsfollowingRLV introduction.
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Figure 4-3: A Possible STS-RLV-HRLV Phasing Strategy (Option 3)
A mature RLV system would successfully secure virtually all access-to-space markets addressing
MLV/ILV/HLV payload classes, except for Titan IV. Therefore, according to our Vision 2020
studies, targeting a 2015 IOC for HRLV may not appear cost effective to NASA, considering that
RLV should be in its prime at that time and for the foreseeable future.
As discussed earlier, does NASA risk reduction funding validate the recurring saving? As an
annual recurring cost reduction (in terms of percentage), significant NASA savings result, but
absolute savings are much less impressive.
Option 3 appears the most promising of the three HRLV introduction options. Probable events
outside the scope of our discussions will also shape the viability and details of HRLV Option 3
(e.g. advanced space station, Lunar/Mars exploration, Mega LEO, etc.) A variation on this option
would be to stretch out RLV development (due to further risk reduction requirements) and
incorporate selected HRST technologies.
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5.0 POTENTIALHRSTOVERLAY: HYPOTHETICALSCENARIO
5.1 MagLifterplusRBCCRLV
A uniqueconceptfor ETOlaunchis theapplicationof a low-accelerationelectromagneticatapult.
Until recently,thebasictechnologiesdid notexist to enablethepracticalpursuitof catapultspace
launchconcepts.However,thedevelopmentof newtechnologiesmayenablesucha concepto be
appliedasa"virtual first stage"for HRLVs andsubsequentlyprovidelower operationcosts. An
accelerationof 3g,providedby stagezero(virtual first stage),significantlyincreasestheeffective
specificimpulsefor awiderangeof launchvehicles.Theconceptexaminedfor HRST, andbased
upon superconductingmagneticlevitation(maglev)technology,is known as "MagLifter". We
conceptualizeanRBCC(rocket-basedcombinedcycle)RLV asthelaunchvehicle.
Theconfigurationin Figure5-1 assumesthattheRLV launchvehiclecanapply aerodynamiclift
duringlaunch.Thelaunchvehiclealsofeaturesanair-breather/rocketcombinedpropulsionsystem
with anassumedGLOWof 1.2Mlbsat 1200mph(payload=40Klbm to LEO).
Asabasis,weselectedtheRLV rocket-based,aerodynamiclifting bodywhich is assumedto have
aGLOWof -2.4 Mlbs. TheRBCCRLV, usingmaglevfor stagezero,hasa GLOWof 1.2 Mlbs
(eachtechnologydropstheRLV massby -25%). This includesaddedvehiclereinforcementfor
robustness(worsemassfraction).
I Other Facilities
Not Shown
(e.g.,Control
Center,
Landing Area, HRST
Storage, etc.) Release
Pdrnary Power Point
System LAUNCH
(e.g.,SMESoption) _ _;Engine Start for _,_.___
Pre-Release Check-Out _ R
(Design Option) _ t[_
.°.,.rato, I ', / ;
Guideway l _ _ I Decelerator I
, I Power ragei Guidewey ,
Staging J__FVe_h_lendl _ __ _1_ Sub-StaUonsI Ii I
Facility _ I II I
L.._ 6 - 9 miles _'J-" 0.5 miles---_!
I I i
10000 feet
(Approx.)
3500 feet
(Approx.)
Figure 5-1: MagLifter Operation Concept -- Aerodynamic Lift Application
The unique characteristics of a MagLifter plus RBCC RLV allow a much smaller RLV (-50%)
with equivalent delivery. We believe that a low latitude site (say <35°N) would accommodate both
GTO and Polar missions, although at some performance penalty (for the launch azimuths not
aligned with the MagLifter guideway). Adequate recovery landing strips would also have to be
closely positioned. Acceptable launch sites and the number of launch guideways are limited by
(see Figure 5-2):
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• Siteterrain,includingelevation,slope,availabilityandpower-availability
• Complexityof groundaccelerationguideways
• Impactof overflightrules(population,nationalparks,etc.)
• Siteconstructionand operation costs -- area remoteness
• Desired market base (available guideways determine possible customers)
• Panamlnt, Callfornla
- GTO (overflight Issue)
- Remote/Hot Area
_-7_ 7 _ ?.....<" i=-: --_
- <'_,, _ *',: I ,'-_ Mauna Loa, Hawaii
• Alamogordo, New Mexico
- GTO (overflight Issue)
- Access to WSMPJSRS
Figure 5-2." Potential US HRL V Launch and Recovery Sites
As shown, we have cursorily identified three potential HRLV launch sites. Anyone of the
candidates probably could be groomed for both GTO and Polar missions. The two CONUS sites
would have MagLifter guideways oriented in an easterly direction (GTO optimal). The Hawaiian
site guideway could be oriented either for Polar or GTO missions. It also has the _eatest zero-
stage benefits because of its latitude and altitude.
Our operations concept implies a smaller vehicle than current RLV designs (-50% reduction).
Though this constitutes a new vehicle development (DDT&E of -1B and vehicles production -70%
of RLV), the smaller vehicle is predicted to contribute to a savings in RLV operation costs of
-30%. However, this must be weighed against the cost of a MagLifter development (combined
DDT&E plus one facility at -$1B) and its associated operations costs. All costs are optional, but
represent optimistic extrapolations from RLV.
The two HRST development options are shown in Figure 5-3. Both are derived from our most
plausible scenario of infusing HRST technology into the RLV prior to the latter's IOC.
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Option 1
I
RBC_ ||C_I Retro Fit RLV
Mag LiftePJl-ll Baseline
I
I 511--70% PayloadIncrease
I
I Payload Bay
Volume
Insufficient
I
I Minimal OpsCosts Savings
I RBCC RLV/MagLifter IOptions Option 2
I
I I "ewls°v"___-qame Options _ / Smaller RLV
I(RBCC+MagLifter)Scale _¢.ale I
I
Not Viable
I I NewDevelopment
RLV (RBCC)
DDT&E 1-$1.25B)
Vehicle Production (>80% of RLV,
say $375M/vehicle X 2 Vehicles)
MagLifter IDevelopm nt
LDDT&E facility) 3_ $1BProduction (1
I
Benefit: Save 30% RLV OPS (smaller [
vehicle) but add to MagLifter OPS costs I
Figure 5-3: Two HRLV Development Scenarios
As indicated, the two options differ based upon the vehicle scaling philosophy adopted. Option 1
requires that the basic RLV design be modifiable directly to the HRLV configuration at the same
scale. If this is possible, we estimate that the HRST would have a delivery capability 50-75%
greater than the baselined RLV (e.g. 60-70 Klbm to LEO). Two problems immediately arise: (1)
the payload bay is far too small to accommodate this mass and, even if it could, (2) the vehicle
would be overmatched to the market centroid (20-40 Klbm to LEO). For these and other reasons
shown, we do not recommend this option.
Option 2 appears far more viable. The pertinent details are shown in Figure 5-3. The basic
philosophy here is to down scale the baseline RLV design by -50% for HRLV. We would even
consider adjusting downward the LEO payload (to between 20 to 30 Klbm), if that were a good
match to the market payload centroid. In any case, the details of the HRLV development and
operations financial picture are highlighted.
Next, we address these issues to determine the true cost-benefit of a combined MagLifler/HRST
(RBCC RLV) development and operation, when compared to the proposed RLV.
5.2 HRLV Cost Scenario: Combined MagLifler/RBCC RLV
Consider a scenario for implementing an HRST system based upon the following assumptions (see
Figure 5-3):
• HRST technology infusion into RLV Phase [] --- program stretchout
• STS modernization effort initiated in 2000 -- phaseout planned for 2013
• A NASA development of ASTP, with a front-loaded investment of $2B over a period from
2002 to 2006 --- not charged to industry
• A follow-on to ASTP leading to a commercial HRST, with a front-loaded investment of
$3B over a period from 2007 to 2010 ($2B for RBCC including vehicles and $1B for
MagLifter zero stage) --- commercially developed
• HRLV IOCin 2011
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Operating costs are based upon delivering 20-40 Klbm payload to LEO by an Atlas-class HRLV
with a $100M p3I/year and a pricing schedule of $10M/flight. Operating cost for the HRLV range
from $13.7M/flight at 20 flights/year, down to $2.25M/flight at 100 flights/year, after 7 years
including P3I. Revenues start in 2011. Our notional HRLV traffic model is shown in Figure 5-4.
Because of reduced prices, this base model is approximately twice that of the corresponding RLV
model (see Figure 2-8).
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
USG 0 10 20 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
Commercial 0 10 30 50 50 60 60 70 70 70 80
Cost/Flight m 13.7 5.4 3.3 3.0 2.6 2.5 2.2 2.2 2.1 1.9
[$M FY96]
Figure 5-4: HRL V Notional Traffic Model - 2011 to 2020
The indicated operation costs (cost/flight) reflect both the rate/learning, plus the benefits from the
continuing P3I program. Thus, we note that both revenues (flight rate x price) and gross profits
((price - cost) x flight rate) increase over the period of the model. We believe that the very high
flight rates are consistent with our pricing structure.
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Figure 5-5:
YEAR
HRL V After Tax Cash Flow per Year
Figures 5-5 and 5-6 illustrate two of the financials for our hypothetical HRLV scenarios. The
former displays the net cash flow (income minus expenditures) in then year dollars. Note that we
have not shown the NASA ASTP technology prototype funding (>$2B) for RLV (RBCC) plus
MagLifter. This funding would occur over a time window of 2002-06. The income stream begins
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in 2011. Recall that this net income stream is the difference between revenues and operating costs
(recurring operations plus 1'31). Our total operating costs (-2017 steady state) are best thought of
in terms of annual outlays of-$225M (100 flights), broken out as follows:
• 75 upper stages at -$0.5M each = $38M
• Propellants at $0.3M each (100 flights) = 30
• RLV (RBCC) operations and spares = 32
• MagLifler operations and spares = 25
• p3Iprogram = 100
TOTAL = $225M
Many of the cost elements shown above are very optimistic. An increase in upper stage costs to
$2.0M each would increase operation costs by 50% alone. HRLV operation costs and spares are
also very optimistic. However, this level of operation cost is necessary if we are going to get
"cost" to LEO under $100/lbm. This operations cost, including p3I, equate to $116/lbm to LEO.
Without P3I, LEO delivery is $83/lbm. Note that customer costs (e.g. price) is -$333/1bm (e.g.
price=$10M for 30 Klbm). Finally, the net cash flows reflect not only the increasing flight traffic,
but also the 4% annual inflation rate.
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Figure 5-6: HRLV Cumulative After Tax Cash Flow
Figure 5-6 transforms the net cash flows of Figure 5-5 into a cumulative (after tax) cash flow. In
turn, Figure 5-7 transforms Figure 5-6 into a cumulative net present value (NPV), where we have
discounted the annual outlays/incomes by our notional 20% hurdle rate. This technique discounts
the value of money by 20% each year after the beginning of the program (2007). Thus, HRLV
revenues in 2011 (four years after HRLV program go ahead) are discounted by -60% (= ... 1-(1-
0.2)4!). This hurdle rate calculation is a common commercial technique for measuring the cost-
benefit of alternative business investments. The hurdle rate selected by a corporation reflects both
missed opportunity costs (other investment possibilities not taken) plus a measure of the candidate
program risk (technical, schedule, financial/market).
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Figure 5-7: HRL V Cumulative Net Present Value
Figure 5-6 reflects the HRLV team's exposure to -$3000M in 2010-11, with payback occurring in
2016. However, as shown in Figure 5-7, the cumulative NPV does not reach zero, and the HRLV
program fails to achieve the required 20% hurdle rate by 2020 (IRR=12.3%). Interestingly, if the
commercial HRLV development could be reduced to $1.7B (instead of $3B), then the payback
occurs in 2015 and the 20% hurdle rate requirement is achieved in 2020.
Our baseline RLV captures -56 flights/year (2010-15) at $25M each (see Figure 2-8). RLV
operation cost should be -$7.5M/flight (at this flight rate). The financial details are as follows:
Annual revenues:
Annual operations costs:
(includes $100M/year p3I)
Gross profits:
RLV(56) HRLV (100) HRLV (150)
$1400M $1000M $1200M
$520M $225M $300M
$880M $775M $900M
We conclude that HRLV needs a larger market (>100 flights/year) to be cost-effective compared to
RLV. As shown, we estimate that HRLV must capture over 150 flights/year to achieve the same
gross profit as RLV. It is unclear as to whether the market is sufficiently elastic such that 150
flights/year at $8M each is a reasonable anticipated growth from our RLV operating point (-56
flights/year at a price of $25M). The assumed HRLV operating costs at this higher flight rate is
$2.0M. At this juncture there is simply no way to predict this.
Our bottomline is that the HRLV system represents an meaningful step beyond the RLV system
with regard to broadening space access markets. As indicated, HRLV has to effectively triple the
RLV's flight rate (to -150 flights/year) at the assumed prices to be profitable. Additionally, HRLV
must find ways to substantially cut development costs. Otherwise, the requisite investment hurdle
rate cannot be met. In short, HRLV has to achieve a delicate balance in these various
market/financial parameters to be successful. We see the biggest potential winner in this process as
the new, growth market customers --- a revolution in space access marketing t
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6.0 SLV-CLASSHRLV PROGRAMASSESSMENT
A majordriver in HRLV developmentis to provide low cost accessto spacefor thosemarkets
typically foundon anSLV manifest.Thesearefrequentlycustomerswith limitedbudgets,where
eventheleastexpensiveEI'O cost/Ibm delivery restricts payloads to less than 1 Klbm. These
markets are easily lost by the cost of technology developments.
Consider the following launch traffic scenario for the University Space Research Association
(USRA) shown in Figure 6-1. Let us assume that USRA has an annual budget to conduct E-q'O
activity of about $150M, an optimistic amount considering that most of USRA's activities are
funded by NASA grants and contracts, and that the NASA budget is declining.
$1.0M s/c
$1.0M launch
"$2.0M
= USRA Budget
(~$1S0M/yr)
• SLV Prototype is
Developed by NASA
• Commercialization is
Assumed to be $30M
• Amortization + Profit
- $0.2M per flight
• 3 year amortization
IFt SLV Carrier_ _her Carr_
I Due East I I Polar IMissions [ Missions I(Wallops) [Alaska, VAFB) I
I I
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Figure 6-1: SLV Economics -- What Price Risk?
The cost of transportation is the real driver in the academic market. If the cost of a total
transportation could be reduced to $2M ($1M for payload/spacecraft, $1M for launch), then a
potential 75 flights per year could be achieved by USRA. Of these flights, consider that 50 are
dedicated to an SLV-class carrier while other carders absorb the remaining 25 missions. With an
SLV-class system developed by NASA (perhaps within the scope of ASTP), commercialization
assumed to be $30M, and a 3-year amortization, then one looks at a (optimistic) launch return
(amortization or gross profit) of about $0.2M/flight, assuming that no more than the remaining
$0.8M/flight is "lost" to development costs. This leads to a Voss "profit" of $10M/year for 50
flights. The question is whether such a small profit justifies the risk faced in undertaking an SLV-
class new start merely to satisfy such a budget-constrained customer.
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A morecost-effectivealternativemaybefoundin committingnumerouspayloads(a multi-manifest
payloadmission)to the launchof a singlevehiclein thecurrentinventory(e.g. STS, someother
ELV) oroneexpectedtobeon-linewhenthepayloadneedarises(e.g. RLV). Anotherapproach
mightbe in finding payloadspaceon a vehiclealreadycommittedto launchfor other reasons(a
parasitepayloadmission). Indeed,academiais currently heavilydependenton their payloads
beingableto "hitch rides" on STSmissions(almostfor FREEin somecases)in order to afford
accessto space.
Thebottomlineis thatobtainingareasonableROI andprofit from a new technologydevelopment,
often reducesthe potentialmarket to the few customersable to afford the new technology's
expensiveproduct. Manyof theparticipantswithin theSLV marketcannotafford to underwritea
newlaunchsystem. Smallpayloadsfrequentlyreflectsmallbudgets,andin thecost-competitive
SLV marketthereisagreaterneed,in ouropinion,for cleverpackaging(of plannedsystems)and
marketingthanin newtechnology.
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7.0 SUMMARY
In our strategic analysis of the HRLV system, and of the projected global marketplace from which
it (or any launch system) must gain its support, we conclude that HRST's viability, as a cost-
effective ETO launch system enterprise, is challenged in today's rapid explosion of launch
systems. This conclusion is based on:
The ETO launch industry is currently saturated across the full payload class spectrum.
There appears to be little gained by introducing a new system if it does not offer significant
differences in cost and operation from what already exists or that is under development
(shown in Figure 7-1). HLRV could address this criteria.
NASA budget projections are not favorable to support simultaneous development of
redundant launch systems which service the same customer community. We see HRST
technology infusion into RLV as a viable option.
HRST may be best viewed as an insurance policy for RLV. Several of the ASTP technologies
could be infused gracefully into RLV (e.g. upper stages).
Payload Classes
SLV MLV ILV HLV/STS I
• SLV - 2 stage expendible
partially reusable (new
technology program)
I---- EELV/Commercial ELV _t • STS "
• LMLV • Atlas lIAR • Ariane V
• X-34C/RBCC - 2 stage
partially reusable (new
technology program)
• Kistler K-1,2,3
2 stage partially reusable
• Delta III
• LKE Proton/Asia
Pacific site
• Pegasus XL
• MSLS
I.
Multi manifest
I
Parasitic manifest
(space available at
cost)
X-33A
(Teledesic)/
I RLV
Possible
upgrades Mag Lev
RBCC
Figure 7-1: Market and Launch Vehicle Matchup
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Our preliminary HRST findings include:
• RLV/EELV success greatly facilitate HRST technology infusion.
• ETO development initiatives worldwide currently saturated.
• ASTP technology represents potential components of HRLV or RLV block changes.
• We concur that NASA has identified the best, high payoff ASTP technologies for HRST.
• HRST can be thought of as an overlay to the existing RLV/STS modernization program.
• High HRLV development cost likely requires USG/Industry partnership.
• Confidence in reusable launch systems await X-33/X-34/RLV demonstrations.
- HRLV operations must be solidly grounded in proven RLV experiences - an HRLV
prerequisite.
• HRLV upper stage technology gracefully transitions into RLV.
Our analysis suggests that HRLV has a great potential as a vehicle serving missions beyond LEO,
and as such enabling further space exploration. HRST, applied as a modern, low cost upper stage
for RLV, could be an invaluable contribution to NASA's centerpiece RLV program. Depending on
the success of ASTP propulsion developments, reusability would be invaluable when applied to
Orbital Maneuvering Vehicles or Orbital Transfer Vehicles (OMVs, OTVs, space tugs, remote
cargo transfer vehicles), improving the operability of any orbiting facility (e.g. ISS, space
operations center, space business park) or perhaps improving access to GTO or GSO. The
concept could also be applied to advanced transportation systems for Lunar or Mars missions,
making such activity more economically favorable.
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